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Abstract
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population
of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works
have focused only on the unconstrained case. That is, the allowed equilibrium of the game is not
constrained. To further extend the capabilities of population games, in this paper we propose a
novel class of primal-dual evolutionary dynamics that allow the consideration of constraints that
must be satisfied at the equilibrium of the game. Using duality theory and Lyapunov stability
theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability and feasibility of
the equilibria set of the game under the considered constraints. Furthermore, we illustrate the
application of the developed theory to some classical population games with the addition of
constraints.
Keywords— Evolutionary game theory; Nonlinear models; Convex optimization; Duality.
1 Introduction
Population games provide an evolutionary game theoretical framework to study the decision making process
of a population of players [13], [21]. As such, the study of population games and population dynamics have
received significant attention over the control community [20]. For instance, the authors in [19] illustrate
the application of population dynamics to the dynamic resource allocation in a water distribution system.
Similarly, the authors in [23] rely on the formalism of population games to design evolutionary dynamics for
the control of wireless networks. Furthermore, the authors in [16] have extended the classic (memoryless)
population games to a framework with dynamic payoff mechanisms, which allows the consideration of more
general control scenarios, and the authors in [8], [18], and [2], have developed a set of powerful dissipativity
tools for the study of such dynamical payoff models.
Although population games have been widely studied in the literature, most of the previous works
have focused only on the unconstrained case. That is, the equilibrium of the game has no constraints
regarding the amount of players playing the different strategies. Clearly, this is a significant limitation as
real-world engineering applications usually have constraints over the control variables. One exception is the
work of [3], where the concept of mass dynamics is introduced to consider decoupled and coupled affine
constraints that the players should asymptotically satisfy. Another exception is the work of [4], where the
authors propose some novel class of decision-making protocols so that a set of decoupled affine inequality
constraints is dynamically satisfied. In contrast with such previous works, in this paper we consider general
(coupled and/or decoupled) convex inequality constraints that the players should asymptotically satisfy at
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the equilibrium of the game. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies such type of
constraints in the context of population games.
Consequently, the main contribution of this paper is the formulation and analysis of a novel class of
primal-dual evolutionary game dynamics, which allow the satisfaction of general convex inequality con-
straints at the equilibrium of the population game. Inspired by [16], and exploiting the duality theory of
convex optimization, we propose a dynamic primal-dual game whose payoffs evolve over time to motivate
the satisfaction of the given constraints. Moreover, using standard Lyapunov stability theory, we provide
sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the proposed dynamics for certain classes of
constrained population games.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the proposed primal-dual game
and primal-dual evolutionary dynamics. Then, Section 3 provides the theoretical analyzes. Afterwards,
Section 4 presents some numerical experiments as illustration. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and
provides some future directions of research.
2 Constrained population games and primal-dual evolutionary dynamics
Consider a population of players engaged in an anonymous game with a finite set of strategies denoted as
S = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n ∈ Z≥2. Throughout, we refer to such population as the primal population. At
any time, the fraction of players playing the strategy i ∈ S is denoted as xi ∈ R≥0, and the state of the
primal population is described by the vector x = [xi] ∈ Rn≥0. Therefore, the set of all possible population
states is given by
∆P =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑
i∈S
xi = mP
}
, (1)
where mP ∈ R>0 denotes the total mass of the primal population. Furthermore, every strategy i ∈ S has
an associated fitness function, fi : Rn≥0 → R, which provides the payoff obtained by the players playing such
strategy at a given population state. Consequently, the primal population game is completely characterized
by the fitness vector f : Rn≥0 → Rn, which is obtained by assembling all the fitness functions into a vector,
i.e., f(·) = [fi(·)] ∈ Rn. Depending on the form of f(·), a different type of game might be considered. In this
paper, we focus mainly on the class of full-potential games.
Definition 2.1 ([21]). Let f : Rn≥0 → Rn be a population game. If there exists a continuously differentiable
(potential) function p : Rn≥0 → R that satisfies ∇xp(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ Rn≥0, then f(·) is a full-potential
game.
In the context of full-potential games, the goal for the population players is to collectively maximize a
potential function. In contrast with most of the previous works where such maximization is unconstrained,
in this paper the players must collectively maximize a potential function subject to constraints over the
population state. More precisely, every equilibrium state of the primal game must be an optimal solution to
the constrained optimization problem given by
max
x∈∆P
p(x) s.t. gk(x) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ C, (2)
where C = {1, 2, . . . , q} denotes the set of constraints, with |C| = q ∈ Z≥1; and gk : Rn≥0 → R is a function
that characterizes the k-th constraint. Throughout, we define the feasible region of the primal population
game as
X = {x ∈ Rn≥0 : gk(x) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ C} .
Moreover, we often consider the following assumptions regarding the primal population game, the constraint
functions {gk(·)}k∈C , and the feasible region X .
Assumption 2.1. The primal population game f(·) is a full-potential game with twice continuously differ-
entiable concave potential function p(·).
Assumption 2.2. For every k ∈ C, the corresponding constraint function gk(·) is convex and twice contin-
uously differentiable.
Assumption 2.3. There exists some x˜ ∈ Rn>0 ∩∆P such that gk(x˜) < 0 for all k ∈ C.
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Remark 2.1. Notice that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are common regularity conditions in the field
of convex optimization. Namely, Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 characterize the smoothness and convexity of
the problem in (2), and Assumption 2.3 is the Slater’s constraint qualification condition which provides a
sufficient condition for strong duality to hold [5].
Remark 2.2. Since a population game is a decentralized decision making process, i.e., there is not a global
coordinator to set the players’ strategies, and since we are interested in the consideration of general (decoupled
and/or coupled) convex inequality constraints, in this paper we limit to the case where the constraints must
be satisfied only at the equilibrium of the population game, i.e., asymptotically rather than dynamically. Note
that such asymptotic satisfaction of constraints has also received significant attention in the related field of
distributed optimization [6], [24], [14], [15], [1].
To handle the aforementioned constraints, in this paper we introduce a second population game. Namely,
consider a second population of players, here referred to as the dual population, where the players are engaged
in a population game with a set of strategies denoted as Ce = C ∪ {0}. Such set of strategies corresponds to
the set of constraints C extended with an additional (null) strategy indexed by 0. Hence, |Ce| = |C|+1 = q+1.
Throughout, we define g0 : Rn → {0}, i.e., g0(·) = 0, such that the set {gk(·)}k∈Ce is well defined. At any
time, the fraction of players of the dual population playing the strategy k ∈ Ce is denoted as µk ∈ R≥0, and
the state of the dual population is given by the vector µ = [µk] ∈ Rq+1≥0 . Thus, the set of all possible dual
population states is
∆D =
{
µ ∈ Rq+1≥0 :
∑
k∈Ce
µk = mD
}
, (3)
where mD ∈ R>0 is the total mass of the dual population. As before, every strategy k ∈ Ce has an associated
function that provides the payoff obtained by the players playing such strategy. However, in contrast with
the primal population game, in this case, such functions are independent of the dual population state, and,
instead, take as argument the primal population state. More precisely, the payoff of the strategy k ∈ Ce at
the primal state x ∈ ∆P is given by gk(x). Therefore, the dual population game is fully characterized by the
vector g (·) = [gk(·)] ∈ Rq+1. In order to couple the primal game with the dual game, we further define the
primal-dual population game, fµ(·, ·) = [fµi (·, ·)] ∈ Rn, where fµi : Rn≥0 × Rq+1≥0 → R, for all i ∈ S. Namely,
the value fµi (x,µ) provides the payoff obtained by the players of the primal population playing the strategy
i ∈ S at the primal state x ∈ ∆P and at the dual state µ ∈ ∆D. In particular, in this paper we set
fµi (x,µ) = fi(x)−
∑
k∈Ce
µk
∂gk(x)
∂xi
, ∀i ∈ S. (4)
Thus, the primal-dual game is an extension of the primal game, f(·), that considers the constraints {gk(·)}k∈C
and the dual state µ ∈ ∆D.
Now that we have defined the primal, dual, and primal-dual games, we proceed to introduce the evo-
lutionary dynamics that describe the evolution of the primal and dual population states. Following the
approach of [21], we assume that the players of each population are equipped with some revision protocols
to revise their strategies. More precisely, in this paper we focus on the class of impartial pairwise comparison
protocols [16]. Namely, the players of the primal population are equipped with a protocol ρj : R→ R≥0, for
all j ∈ S, which provides the incentive to switch to strategy j ∈ S, and the players of the dual population
are equipped with a protocol φl : R→ R≥0, for all l ∈ Ce, which provides the incentive to switch to strategy
l ∈ Ce. Moreover, for every j ∈ S and every l ∈ Ce, the functions ρj(·) and φl(·) are locally Lipschitz
continuous and satisfy that {
ρj(α) > 0, if α > 0
ρj(α) = 0, if α ≤ 0 ∀α ∈ R, ∀j ∈ S, (5a){
φl(α) > 0, if α > 0
φl(α) = 0, if α ≤ 0 ∀α ∈ R, ∀l ∈ Ce. (5b)
Therefore, by letting ρji : R
n
≥0 ×Rq+1≥0 → R≥0 denote the incentive to switch from strategy i ∈ S to strategy
j ∈ S, the primal evolutionary dynamics are stated as
ρji (x,µ) = ρj
(
fµj (x,µ)− fµi (x,µ)
)
, ∀i, j ∈ S, (6a)
x˙i =
∑
j∈S
(
xjρ
i
j(x,µ)− xiρji (x,µ)
)
, ∀i ∈ S. (6b)
3
Primal-dual game
and primal dynamics
Dual dynamics
Figure 1: Positive feedback loop interconnection of the primal-dual game, the primal dynamics, and
the dual dynamics.
Similarly, by letting φlk : Rn≥0 → R≥0 denote the incentive to switch from strategy k ∈ Ce to strategy l ∈ Ce,
the dual evolutionary dynamics are defined as
φlk(x) = φl (gl(x)− gk(x)) , ∀k, l ∈ Ce, (7a)
µ˙k =
∑
l∈Ce
(
µlφ
k
l (x)− µkφlk(x)
)
, ∀k ∈ Ce. (7b)
Remark 2.3. Notice that, as shown in Fig. 1, the primal-dual game (4) and the primal and dual dynamics
(6)-(7) can be seen as two different nonlinear dynamical systems that are interconnected in a positive feedback
loop. Furthermore, such a positive feedback loop interconnection of evolutionary dynamics can be regarded as
an instance of the EDM-PDM (evolutionary dynamics model - payoff dynamics model) systems proposed in
[16], [17]. For instance, the primal-dual game (4) and the primal dynamics (6) can be thought as an EDM
that describes the evolution of the primal population state as a function of the dual state µ ∈ ∆D, and the
dual dynamics (7) can be seen as a PDM that dynamically modifies the payoffs for the EDM based on the
primal state x ∈ ∆P .
Remark 2.4. As mentioned above, in this paper we focus on the class of evolutionary dynamics that result
from using impartial pairwise comparison protocols. The motivation being that such a class of dynamics has
some desirable properties that we exploit in our theoretical analyses. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
in the literature there are many other classes of evolutionary dynamics that might be worth exploring under
the considered primal-dual framework. Some novel examples include generalized imitation dynamics [25],
relative best response dynamics [9], and proximal dynamics [10], among others.
As shown in Fig. 1 and highlighted in Remark 2.3, the primal-dual game, the primal dynamics, and
the dual dynamics, together can be thought as the components of two nonlinear dynamical systems that
interact in a positive feedback loop interconnection. Throughout, we refer to such an interconnected sys-
tem as the primal-dual system, which is an (n + q + 1)-dimensional system whose state vector is given by
[x>,µ>]> ∈ R(n+q+1)≥0 . Moreover, we further impose the following standing assumption regarding the initial
conditions of that system.
Standing Assumption 1 x(0) ∈ ∆P and µ(0) ∈ ∆D.
In the forthcoming section, we provide the theoretical analyses regarding such a primal-dual system.
3 Analysis of the proposed primal-dual system
In this section, we provide our main theoretical developments regarding the primal-dual system presented
in Section 2. First, we show some invariance properties of the considered dynamics. Then, we characterize
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the equilibria set of the primal-dual system. Finally, we provide our main results regarding the stability of
the interconnected nonlinear system.
3.1 Invariance analysis
In this section, we characterize some sets that are positively invariant under the considered primal-dual
system. Namely, ∆P is positively invariant under the dynamics (6), and ∆D is positively invariant under
the dynamics (7). More precisely, x(0) ∈ ∆P =⇒ x(t) ∈ ∆P , for all t ≥ 0, and µ(0) ∈ ∆D =⇒ µ(t) ∈ ∆D,
for all t ≥ 0. These invariance properties are formally stated in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Lemma 3.1. The set ∆P is positively invariant under the primal dynamics (6).
Proof. First note that ∑
i∈S
x˙i =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
(
xjρ
i
j(x,µ)− xiρji (x,µ)
)
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xjρ
i
j(x,µ)−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xiρ
j
i (x,µ)
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xjρ
i
j(x,µ)−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xjρ
i
j(x,µ)
= 0.
Thus,
∑
i∈S xi(0) = mP =⇒
∑
i∈S xi(t) = mP , for all t ≥ 0. Second, for every i ∈ S it holds that if xi = 0,
then x˙i ≥ 0. Hence, x(0) ∈ Rn≥0 =⇒ x(t) ∈ Rn≥0, for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, x(0) ∈ ∆P =⇒ x(t) ∈ ∆P , ∀t ≥
0. 
Lemma 3.2. The set ∆D is positively invariant under the dual dynamics (7).
Proof. Due to the similarity between (6) and (7), the proof is virtually identical to the proof of Lemma
3.1. 
Furthermore, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 together lead to the following result that fully characterizes the
invariance properties of the proposed primal-dual system.
Proposition 3.1. The set ∆P×∆D ⊂ Rn+q+1≥0 is positively invariant under the proposed primal-dual system.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. 
Remark 3.5. Note that the Standing Assumption 1, in conjunction with Proposition 3.1, allows us to
assume, without any additional loss of generality, that x(t) ∈ ∆P and µ(t) ∈ ∆D, for all t ≥ 0. This fact
plays a crucial role in the forthcoming analyses.
3.2 Equilibria set analysis
We now proceed to characterize the equilibria set of the considered primal-dual system. For such, let us first
introduce the concepts of Nash equilibria for the primal, dual, and primal-dual games.
Typically, the set of Nash equilibria of a population game is defined as the set of population states where
no player has incentives to change her strategy [21]. With this concept in mind, the set of Nash equlibria of
the primal game f(·) can be defined as
NE (f) =
{
x ∈ ∆P : x ∈ arg max
y∈∆P
y>f(x)
}
. (8)
In contrast, the Nash equilibria of the dual game g(·) is a function of the primal state x ∈ ∆P . More
precisely,
NE (g,x) =
{
µ ∈ ∆D : µ ∈ arg max
z∈∆D
z>g(x)
}
. (9)
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Similarly, the Nash equilibria of the primal-dual game fµ(·, ·) is a function of the dual state µ ∈ ∆D. Namely,
NE (fµ,µ) =
{
x ∈ ∆P : x ∈ arg max
y∈∆P
y>fµ(x,µ)
}
. (10)
Therefore, for any fixed µ∗ ∈ ∆D, the set NE (fµ,µ∗) contains the Nash equilibria, in the sense of (8), of
the population game fµ(·,µ∗). These definitions for the set of Nash equilibria of the dual and primal-dual
games allow us to provide the following results.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that g(·) is continuous. Consider the dual dynamics (7), let µ˙ = [µ˙k] ∈ Rq+1, and
let x∗ ∈ ∆P . Then, NE (g,x∗) is nonempty, and µ˙ = 0 if and only if µ ∈ NE (g,x∗).
Proof. The claim that NE (g,x∗) 6= ∅ follows from the continuity of g(·), the compactness of ∆D, and the
Weierstrass Theorem. To prove the second claim, let us consider the sufficient and necessary cases separately.
(Sufficiency) Let µ ∈ NE (g,x∗). From (9), it holds that µk > 0 =⇒ gk(x∗) = maxl∈Ce gl(x∗), for all
k ∈ Ce. Thus, from (5b) and (7a) it follows that µkφlk(x∗) = 0, for all k, l ∈ Ce. Hence, µ˙ = 0.
(Necessity) Suppose that µ˙ = 0 but µ /∈ NE (g,x∗). Let k ∈ Ce be such that gk(x∗) = maxl∈Ce gl(x∗).
Thus, from (5b) and (7a) it follows that µkφ
l
k(x
∗) = 0, for all l ∈ Ce. Hence, µ˙k ≥ 0. Now, since
µ /∈ NE (g,x∗), there exists some z ∈ Ce such that µz > 0 and gz(x∗) < gk(x∗). Therefore, xzφkz(x∗) > 0
and µ˙k > 0. In consequence, µ˙ 6= 0, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that fµ(·, ·) is continuous. Consider the primal dynamics (6), let x˙ = [x˙i] ∈ Rn, and
let µ∗ ∈ ∆D. Then, NE (fµ,µ∗) is nonempty, and x˙ = 0 if and only if x ∈ NE (fµ,µ∗).
Proof. Noting from (10) that x ∈ NE (fµ,µ∗) implies that xi > 0 =⇒ fµi (x,µ∗) = maxj∈S fµj (x,µ∗), for
all i ∈ S, the proof is virtually identical to the one of Lemma 3.3. 
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 characterize a property of the considered dual and primal dynamics termed as
Nash stationarity [21]. Namely, the equilibria set of the considered dual dynamics coincides with the set of
Nash equilibria of the dual game g(·), whilst the equilibria set of the primal dynamics coincides with the
set of Nash equilibria of the primal-dual game fµ(·, ·). Consequently, Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 allow us to fully
characterize the equilibria set of the considered primal-dual system.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), and suppose that g(·) and fµ(·, ·) are continuous.
Then, a point (x∗,µ∗) ∈ ∆P×∆D is an equilibrium state of the primal-dual system if and only if (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E,
where
E =
{
(x,µ) ∈ ∆P ×∆D : x ∈ NE (f
µ,µ)
µ ∈ NE (g,x)
}
. (11)
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. 
Although Theorem 3.1 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a state
[
x>,µ>
]> ∈ Rn+q+1≥0 to
be an equilibrium point of the primal-dual system, it does not guarantee the existence of such an equilibrium
state. Moreover, Theorem 3.1 by itself does not guarantee that the equilibria set E satisfies the considered
constraints {gk(·)}k∈C . To address both of these issues, we provide the following results.
Lemma 3.5. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), the equilibria set
E in (11), and the function
L(x,µ) = p(x)−
∑
k∈Ce
µkgk(x). (12)
Then, E coincides with the set of saddle points of (12). More precisely, (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E if and only if
L(x,µ∗) ≤ L(x∗,µ∗) ≤ L(x∗,µ), ∀x ∈ ∆P , ∀µ ∈ ∆D.
Proof. Note that ∇xL(x,µ) = fµ(x,µ), and ∇µL(x,µ) = −g(x). Thus, from Definition 2.1, for every fixed
µ∗ ∈ ∆D, the game fµ(·,µ∗) is a full-potential game over ∆P with concave potential function L(·,µ∗). Simi-
larly, for every fixed x∗ ∈ ∆P , the game g(x∗) is a full-potential game over ∆D with affine (and thus concave)
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potential function −L(x∗, ·). Therefore, using [21, Corollary 3.1.4] we conclude that x∗ ∈ NE (fµ,µ∗) if and
only if x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈∆P L(·,µ∗), and µ∗ ∈ NE (g,x∗) if and only if µ∗ ∈ arg minµ∈∆D L(x∗, ·). Hence,
x∗ ∈ NE (fµ,µ∗) ⇐⇒ L(x,µ∗) ≤ L(x∗,µ∗), ∀x ∈ ∆P ,
µ∗ ∈ NE (g,x∗) ⇐⇒ L(x∗,µ∗) ≤ L(x∗,µ), ∀µ ∈ ∆D,
which leads to the desired result. 
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), and the
equilibria set E in (11). If the mass of the dual population satisfies that
mD ≥ p
∗ − p(x˜)
mink∈C |gk(x˜)| , (13)
where p∗ , maxx∈∆P∩X p(x), and x˜ ∈ R>0 ∩∆P is any vector satisfying Assumption 2.3, then the set E is
nonempty and every point (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E satisfies that x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈∆P∩X p(x), i.e., x∗ solves (2).
Proof. To prove this result, let us consider a convex optimization perspective. Consider the problem in (2)
and note that its feasible set is ∆P ∩ X . From Assumption 2.2, it follows that X is a closed set (it is the
intersection of the level sets of continuous functions, which are all closed sets). Hence, since ∆P is compact,
it follows that ∆P ∩ X is compact. Therefore, since p(·) is continuous over ∆P ∩ X , from the Weierstrass
Theorem we conclude that there exists an x∗ ∈ ∆P ∩X such that x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈∆P∩X p(x) and p∗ is finite,
i.e., the set of optimal solutions of (2) is nonempty and the optimal value is finite. Using this observation,
in conjunction with Assumption 2.3 (Slater’s condition), we conclude that there exists a vector λ∗ ∈ Rq≥0
such that p∗ = d∗ , d(λ∗), where
d(λ) = max
x∈∆P
(
p(x)−
∑
k∈C
λkgk(x)
)
is the dual function of the dual problem of (2), i.e., d∗ = minλ∈Rq≥0 d(λ). Namely, strong duality holds for
the problem in (2) and there exists a primal-dual optimal solution (x∗,λ∗). Furthermore, note that if x˜ is
any vector satisfying Assumption 2.3, then it follows that
d∗ = p∗ = max
x∈∆P
(
p(x)−
∑
k∈C
λ∗kgk(x)
)
≥ p(x˜)−
∑
k∈C
λ∗kgk(x˜)
≥ p(x˜) + min
z∈C
|gz(x˜)|
∑
k∈C
λ∗k (since x˜ ∈ X ).
Therefore, since minz∈C |gz(x˜)| > 0, it follows that∑
k∈C
λ∗k ≤ p
∗ − p(x˜)
minz∈C |gz(x˜)| ∈ [0,∞).
In consequence, the set of dual optimal solutions of the dual of (2) is bounded. Now, from Lemma 3.2
it holds that µ0(t) = mD −∑k∈C µk(t), for all t ≥ 0. Hence, if we let µ∗k = λ∗k, for all k ∈ C, then the
vector µ∗ ∈ ∆D ⊂ Rq+1≥0 is fully determined by the vector λ∗ ∈ Rq≥0 and the mass mD. Therefore, if mD
satisfies (13), then there exists a point (x∗,µ∗) ∈ ∆P ×∆D that has direct correspondence with the primal-
dual optimal solution (x∗,λ∗). More precisely, the set of primal-dual optimal solutions of (2) is attainable
under the proposed primal-dual evolutionary dynamics. Now, note that since g0(·) = 0, it follows that (12)
is the dual Lagrangian function of (2), where µk ∈ R≥0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the k-th inequality
constraint. Using Lemma 3.5 and [5, Proposition 3.4.1], we conclude that (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E if and only if (x∗,µ∗)
corresponds to a primal-dual optimal solution (x∗,λ∗). Therefore, from the previous discussion it holds that
E is nonempty and that every point (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E satisfies that x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈∆P∩X p(x). 
Remark 3.6. Note that Theorem 3.2 provides sufficient conditions to guarantee that the equilibria set E is
nonempty and feasible with respect to X , i.e., any (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E satisfies that x∗ ∈ X . In particular, notice
that if the right hand side of (13) is zero, then the primal optimal x∗ lies in the interior of X , and, in
consequence, the dual game is not required for the satisfaction of the constraints.
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3.3 Lyapunov stability analysis
In this section, we provide our main results on the asymptotic stability of the proposed primal-dual system.
For such, we develop the corresponding Lyapunov stability analysis of the nonlinear primal-dual evolutionary
dynamics in (6)-(7).
Lemma 3.6. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), the equilibria set E in (11), and the map V : ∆P ×
∆D → R≥0 given by
V (x,µ) =
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiP
j
i (x,µ) +
∑
l∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
µkΦ
l
k(x), (14)
where
P ji (x,µ) =
∫ fµj (x,µ)−fµi (x,µ)
0
ρj(τ)dτ, ∀i, j ∈ S
Φlk(x) =
∫ gl(x)−gk(x)
0
φl(τ)dτ, ∀k, l ∈ Ce.
Then, V (x,µ) ≥ 0 for all (x,µ) ∈ ∆P ×∆D, and V (x∗,µ∗) = 0 if and only if (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E.
Proof. First, note that R≥0 is indeed the codomain of (14). This fact follows from x ∈ ∆P , µ ∈ ∆D,
P ji (·, ·) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ S, and Φlk(·) ≥ 0 for all k, l ∈ Ce. To prove the second claim, we consider the
sufficient and necessary cases separately.
(Sufficiency) If (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E , then x∗ ∈ NE (fµ,µ∗) and µ∗ ∈ NE (g,x∗). In consequence, x∗i > 0 =⇒
fµi (x
∗,µ∗) ≥ fµj (x∗,µ∗) =⇒ P ji (x∗,µ∗) = 0, for all i, j ∈ S. Similarly, µ∗k > 0 =⇒ gk(x∗) ≥ gl(x∗) =⇒
Φlk(x
∗) = 0, for all k, l ∈ Ce. Therefore, V (x∗,µ∗) = 0, for all (x∗,µ∗) ∈ E .
(Necessity) Consider a point (x∗,µ) ∈ ∆P×∆D. Let x∗ ∈ NE (fµ,µ) but suppose µ /∈ NE (g,x∗). Then,
there exists some w, z ∈ Ce such that µw > 0 and gw(x∗) < gz(x∗). In consequence, µwΦzw(x∗) > 0 and
V (x∗,µ) > 0. Now, consider a point (x,µ∗) ∈ ∆P ×∆D. Let µ∗ ∈ NE (g,x) but suppose x /∈ NE (fµ,µ∗).
Then, there exists some v, y ∈ S such that xv > 0 and fµv (x,µ∗) < fµy (x,µ∗). Therefore, xvP yv (x,µ∗) > 0
and V (x,µ∗) > 0. Hence, any (x,µ) ∈ (∆P ×∆D) \ E implies that V (x,µ) > 0. 
Using Lemma 3.6, we now state the following theorem that provides sufficient conditions to guarantee
the asymptotic stability of the equilibria set E under the considered primal-dual dynamics.
Theorem 3.3. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), and the equi-
libria set E in (11). Moreover, assume that E is nonempty. Then, E is asymptotically stable under the
considered dynamics.
Proof. Notice that, due to the local Lipschitz continuity of ρj(·) and φl(·), for all j ∈ S and all l ∈ Ce, and
the compactness of ∆P and ∆D, it follows that the primal-dual dynamics are locally Lipschitz continuous.
Moreover, note that the set E is compact. To see this, observe that E ⊆ ∆P ×∆D is bounded, and that E
is closed because it is the preimage of the closed set {0} under the continuous map provided by (14). In
consequence, the primal-dual dynamics can be investigated using standard Lyapunov stability theory [11,
Corollary 4.7]. From Lemma 3.6, it follows that (14) is a valid Lyapunov function candidate. Hence, we
proceed to analyze its derivatives. For such, let fi , fi(x), fµi , f
µ
i (x,µ), gk , gk(x), P
j
i , P
j
i (x,µ),
Φlk , Φlk(x), ρji , ρ
j
i (x,µ), and φ
l
k , φlk(x), and note that
∂V (x,µ)
∂xy
=
∑
j∈S
P jy +
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xi
∂P ji
∂xy
+
∑
l∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
µk
∂Φlk
∂xy
∂V (x,µ)
∂µz
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xi
∂P ji
∂µz
+
∑
l∈Ce
Φlz,
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for all y ∈ S and all z ∈ Ce. Moreover, observe that∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xi
∂P ji
∂xy
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
j
i
(
∂fµj
∂xy
− ∂f
µ
i
∂xy
)
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
j
i
∂fµj
∂xy
−
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
j
i
∂fµi
∂xy
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
j
i
∂fµj
∂xy
−
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xjρ
i
j
∂fµj
∂xy
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
(
xiρ
j
i − xjρij
) ∂fµj
∂xy
=
∑
j∈S
x˙j
∂fµj
∂xy
(using (6b)).
Similarly, ∑
l∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
µk
∂Φlk
∂xy
=
∑
l∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
µkφ
l
k
(
∂gl
∂xy
− ∂gk
∂xy
)
=
∑
l∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
(
µkφ
l
k − µlφkl
) ∂gl
∂xy
=
∑
l∈Ce
µ˙l
∂gl
∂xy
(using (7b)),
and ∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xi
∂P ji
∂µz
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
j
i
(
∂fµj
∂µz
− ∂f
µ
i
∂µz
)
=
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
(
xiρ
j
i − xjρij
) ∂fµj
∂µz
=
∑
j∈S
x˙j
∂fµj
∂µz
(using (6b))
= −
∑
j∈S
x˙j
∂gz
∂xj
(using (4)).
By defining the vectors ΓP ,
[∑
j∈S P
j
y
]
∈ Rn≥0 and ΓΦ ,
[∑
l∈Ce Φ
l
z
]
∈ Rq+1≥0 , it follows that
∇xV (x,µ) = ΓP + (Dfµ)> x˙ + (Dg)> µ˙
∇µV (x,µ) = ΓΦ −Dgx˙,
where Dfµ ∈ Rn×n is the Jacobian matrix of fµ(·,µ) and is evaluated at (x(t),µ(t)); and Dg ∈ R(q+1)×n
is the Jacobian matrix of g(·) and is evaluated at x(t). Therefore, setting ∇xV , ∇xV (x,µ) and ∇µV ,
∇µV (x,µ), it follows that [
∇xV >,∇µV >
] [ x˙
µ˙
]
= Γ>P x˙ + x˙
>Dfµx˙ + µ˙>Dgx˙ + Γ>Φ µ˙− x˙> (Dg)> µ˙
= Γ>P x˙ + x˙
>Dfµx˙ + Γ>Φ µ˙,
where µ˙>Dgx˙ =
(
µ˙>Dgx˙
)>
= x˙> (Dg)> µ˙ since it is a scalar. From the concavity of p(·) (c.f., Assumption
2.1) and the convexity of gk(·) for all k ∈ Ce (c.f., Assumption 2.2 and recall that g0(·) = 0), it follows that
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x˙>Dfµx˙ ≤ 0 for all t ≥ 0, and (x,µ) ∈ E implies that x˙>Dfµx˙ = 0 since x˙ = 0 at E (c.f., Lemma 3.4).
Hence, we proceed to analyze the other two terms. Note that,
Γ>P x˙ =
∑
y∈S
x˙y
∑
j∈S
P jy
=
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
(
xiρ
y
i − xyρiy
)∑
j∈S
P jy (using (6b))
=
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
y
i
∑
j∈S
P jy −
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
xyρ
i
y
∑
j∈S
P jy
=
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
y
i
∑
j∈S
P jy −
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
y
i
∑
j∈S
P ji
=
∑
y∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρ
y
i
∑
j∈S
(
P jy − P ji
)
.
Similarly,
Γ>Φ µ˙ =
∑
z∈Ce
µ˙z
∑
l∈Ce
Φlz
=
∑
z∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
(
µkφ
z
k − µzφkz
)∑
l∈Ce
Φlz (using (7b))
=
∑
z∈Ce
∑
k∈Ce
µkφ
z
k
∑
l∈Ce
(
Φlz − Φlk
)
.
Here, note that fµy ≤ fµi =⇒ ρyi = 0 and gz ≤ gk =⇒ φzk = 0. Thus, it suffices to analyze the relevant
cases where fµy > f
µ
i and gz > gk. In particular, notice that
fµj ≥ fµy > fµi =⇒ P jy − P ji < 0
fµy > f
µ
j > f
µ
i =⇒ P jy − P ji = 0− P ji < 0
fµy > f
µ
i ≥ fµj =⇒ P jy − P ji = 0− 0 = 0,
and gl ≥ gz > gk =⇒ Φlz − Φlk < 0
gz > gl > gk =⇒ Φlz − Φlk = 0− Φlk < 0
gz > gk ≥ gl =⇒ Φlz − Φlk = 0− 0 = 0.
Therefore, Γ>P x˙ ≤ 0 and Γ>Φ µ˙ ≤ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Hence, E is stable in the sense of Lyapunov. Furthermore,
using (5a), (6a), and the fact that x ∈ NE (fµ,µ) implies that xi > 0 =⇒ fµi = maxj∈S fµj , for all i ∈ S,
it can be shown that Γ>P x˙ = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ NE (fµ,µ) [12, Theorem 7.1]. Since the dual dynamics have the
same form as the primal dynamics, using the same arguments it follows that Γ>Φ µ˙ = 0 ⇐⇒ µ ∈ NE (g,x).
In consequence, the equilibria set E is asymptotically stable. 
Remark 3.7. Notice that if all the conditions of Theorem 3.2 hold, then the result of Theorem 3.3 follows
immediately. Moreover, in such case the set E is not only asymptotically stable, but is also the set of primal-
dual optimal solutions of the convex optimization problem in (2).
Note that, under some different assumptions, the results of Theorem 3.3 are valid for other classes of
games that might not necessarily be full-potential games. We highlight such result in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Let Assumption 2.2 hold. Consider the primal-dual system (6)-(7), and the equilibria set E
in (11). Moreover, assume that E is nonempty and that the primal game f(·) is continuously differentiable
and satisfies that x˙>Df x˙ ≤ 0, for all t ≥ 0, where Df ∈ Rn×n is the Jacobian matrix of f(·) and is evaluated
at x(t); and x˙ = [x˙i] ∈ Rn is determined by (6b). Then, E is asymptotically stable under the considered
dynamics.
Proof. Under the additional assumptions, and noting that x˙>Df x˙ ≤ 0 implies that x˙>Dfµx˙ ≤ 0, the proof
is virtually identical to the proof of Theorem 3.3. 
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Remark 3.8. Although the interpretation of the proposed primal-dual dynamics fits more naturally under
the scope of full-potential games, Corollary 3.1 generalizes our previous stability results to more general
classes of primal games. In particular, one class of games that satisfies the condition x˙>Df x˙ ≤ 0 is the class
of stable/contractive games [12], [16].
4 Numerical experiments
In this section, we provide some numerical experiments to illustrate the formulation of the proposed primal-
dual system regarding some classical games that are extended to consider constraints. It is worth to highlight
that such constraints cannot be considered using conventional population dynamics. Without loss of gener-
ality, we use max(·, 0) for the functions ρj(·) and φl(·), for all j ∈ S and all l ∈ Ce. Note that such revision
protocols lead to the popular Smith dynamics [22]. Moreover, for all the numerical integrations we use a
step size of 0.01s.
4.1 A constrained congestion game
Consider a population of players that seek to travel from point A to point B under the topology depicted
in Fig. 2. There are eight roads, {rk}8k=1, that together provide four possible strategies to travel from A
to B. They are, s1 = {r1, r2}, s2 = {r8, r7, r3, r2}, s3 = {r8, r7, r5, r4}, and s4 = {r8, r6, r4}. In contrast
with classical congestion games [21], here we assume that each road has a maximum usage level denoted as
uk, for all k = 1, 2, . . . , 8. For our experiment, we set u1 = u3 = u5 = u6 = 0.4, u2 = u4 = u7 = 0.6, and
u8 = 0.9, and we assume that mP = 1. Furthermore, we assume that each road has a linear congestion
cost given by bkuk, where bk ∈ R>0 and uk ∈ R≥0 are the weight of congestion and usage level of the the
k-th road, respectively. For simplicity, and to resemble the order of magnitude of the parameters of [21,
Example 3.1.6], we (randomly) set b = [bk] = [15, 16, 11, 13, 13, 5, 17, 18]
>. The potential function for such
a congestion game is thus given by
p(x) =− b1
2
x21 − b2
2
(x1 + x2)
2 − b3
2
x22 − b4
2
(x3 + x4)
2
− b5
2
x23 − b6
2
x24 − b7
2
(x2 + x3)
2
− b8
2
(x2 + x3 + x4)
2,
which satisfies Assumption 2.1. Moreover, the maximum usage levels lead to the constraints x1 ≤ u1;
x2 ≤ u3; x3 ≤ u5; x4 ≤ u6; x1 + x2 ≤ u2; x2 + x3 ≤ u7; x3 + x4 ≤ u4; and x2 + x3 + x4 ≤ u8.
Thus, Assumption 2.2 holds. Consequently, the primal-dual game is given by fµ1 (x,µ) = f1(x) − µ1 − µ5;
fµ2 (x,µ) = f2(x)−µ2−µ5−µ6−µ8; fµ3 (x,µ) = f3(x)−µ3−µ6−µ7−µ8; and fµ4 (x,µ) = f4(x)−µ4−µ7−µ8,
where fi(·) = ∂p(·)/∂xi, for all i ∈ S. Notice that, with x˜ = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]>, it is verified that
Assumption 2.3 holds. Moreover, observe that p∗ ≤ 0, p(x˜) = −12.1875, and mink∈C |gk(x˜)| = 0.1. Hence,
setting mD = 122 satisfies the condition (13) of Theorem 3.2. For such, we set µ0(0) = 122 and µk(0) = 0
for all k ∈ C, so that µ(0) ∈ ∆D. Regarding the primal population, on the other hand, we randomly sample
x(0) from ∆P . Therefore, the Standing Assumption 1 holds. In consequence, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 hold
and the equilibria set E is asymptotically stable and is the primal-dual optimal set of the corresponding
problem in (2) (c.f., Remark 3.7). As illustration, Fig. 3 depicts the temporal evolution of the primal-dual
system. Note that convergence to a fixed point is achieved, and, in fact, such fixed point belongs to E (this
is verified with the aid of a convex optimization solver as shown in Fig. 3).
4.2 Good Rock-Paper-Scissors with constraints
Even though most of the developed analyses have been oriented to full-potential games (c.f., Assumption
2.1), as shown in Corollary 3.1, the developed approach is still applicable to more general classes of games,
e.g., stable/contractive games. As illustration, consider an instance of the classical Good Rock Paper Scissor
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Figure 2: Considered topology for the congestion game.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the primal-dual system for the considered congestion game. The dotted
black lines depict the optimal values of the primal and dual variables of the underlying optimization
problem. Such values are obtained using CVXPY [7]. Note that we are not plotting µ0 due to its
scale (recall that µ0(t) = mD −
∑
k∈C µk(t) for all t ≥ 0).
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Figure 4: Evolution of the primal-dual system under the considered RPS game. Here, x∗ ≈
[0.313, 0.044, 0.643]>.
(RPS) game with a payoff matrix and corresponding fitness functions given by
A =
 0 −1 22 0 −1
−1 2 0
 , f1(x) = 2x3 − x2,f2(x) = 2x1 − x3,
f3(x) = 2x2 − x1,
where we identify the three strategies as 1 → Rock, 2 → Paper, and 3 → Scissors. Moreover, we consider
an unitary mass of agents, i.e., mP = 1, and the coupled convex constraint x21 + x
2
2 ≤ 0.1 (note that such
constraint rules out the unconstrained Nash equilibrium x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 = 1/3). Clearly, the RPS game is
not a full-potential game. Thus, Assumption 2.1 is not satisfied. Nevertheless, it does satisfies the condition
x˙>Df x˙ ≤ 0, for all t ≥ 0, and so the result of Corollary 3.1 follows. In this case, the primal-dual game is
defined as fµ1 (µ,x) = 2x3 − x2 − 2x1µ1; fµ2 (µ,x) = 2x1 − x3 − 2x2µ1; and fµ3 (µ,x) = 2x2 − x1. Moreover,
for our experiment we set x(0) = [1/3, 1/3, 1/3]> and µ(0) = [4, 0]>, and so mD = 4. As illustration, Fig. 4
depicts the evolution of the primal-dual dynamics under such game. Notice that regardless of the non-full-
potential nature of the game, the primal-dual dynamics do converge to E , which in this case is feasible with
respect to X . However, it remains as an open topic to formally characterize the conditions for the feasibility
of E under non-full-potential games, e.g., contractive or weighted-contractive games [2].
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have proposed and analyzed a class of primal-dual evolutionary dynamics that can be
applied to study constrained population games considering general convex inequality constraints. We have
provided sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the equilibria set of the proposed
dynamics when applied both to full-potential and non-full-potential games. Moreover, for the context of full-
potential games, we have deduced sufficient conditions to guarantee that the equilibria set of the dynamics
is feasible with respect to the considered convex constraints. Future work should focus on the extension of
Theorem 3.2 to more general classes of games, e.g., contractive or weighted-contractive games, and to the
study of the dynamic satisfaction of the considered convex constraints.
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